• Of the thirty-seven states (including DC) that have reported total turnout in the 2004 presidential election, the aggregate residual vote rate was 1.1% in 2004. Among these same states, the residual vote rate was 1.9% in 2000.
• Florida and Georgia saw the biggest decreases in the residual vote rate across the past four years, by 2.5% and 3.1%, respectively.
• Only four states ---Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, and Nebraska ---saw increases in their residual vote rates from 2000 and 2004.
• The greatest improvements in residual vote rates occurred in counties that shared the following characteristics:
o The whole state engaged in comprehensive election reform o The county changed its voting machines, especially those that abandoned punch cards.
• Changing voting machines and changing election administration practices often went hand-in-hand. One-half to two-thirds of the reduction in residual vote rate over the past four years appears can be attributed to non-machine factors, including increased electoral competition in "battleground states" and statewide reform efforts. This is a slightly smaller number of states not reporting turnout than in previous years. In addition, as of the writing of this report, three others states have yet to report turnout for 2004.
These are Delaware, Rhode Island, and South Carolina, and account for about 3% of all presidential votes cast. When they release their turnout figures, they will be included in updates to this analysis.
The residual vote rate is a convenient measure, but it must be used with care. Because of the secret ballot, it is impossible to know, for instance, how many ballots that contained a legal vote for president were cast in error. The residual vote rate must be used alongside other measures of voting technology accuracy to gain a complete understanding of how well voting machines perform.
The primary criticism levied against the residual vote rate is that it is impossible to distinguish between a ballot that contains no marks for president because of a technologyinduced error and a ballot that contains no marks for president because the voter consciously abstained. If blank ballots primarily occur because of conscious abstentions and if blank ballots dominate residual votes, then the residual vote rate loses its utility.
For the thirty-seven states (including the District of Columbia) that have thus far reported total turnout, the aggregate residual vote rate was 1.1% in 2004. Among these same states, the residual vote rate was 1.9% in 2000. In fact, the residual vote rate fell more in the battleground states than in the others. Of the thirty-five states in our sample, seven were battleground states ---Florida, Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, and Oregon. The overall reduction in residual vote rate among these states was 1.2%, compared to 0.7% among the remainder.
General reform efforts
After the 2000 general election, a nationwide election reform effort was unleashed.
However, the effort was not uniformly distributed across the states. Some states, like Florida, had highly visible statewide election reform commissions that met immediately on the heals of the election and recommended sweeping reforms of elections. Other states, like Massachusetts and New York, did virtually nothing. Some states had worse problems than others, and naturally they were the ones that were typically the most active. A major theme of many of these reform efforts ---a theme reinforced when the federal Help America Vote Act (HAVA) was passed ---was the replacement of antiquated punch card equipment with more modern equipment. These efforts went beyond the machines, however, into the realm of registration practices, provisional ballots, voter education, and precinct worker training.
Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive set of measures to indicate which states were the most and least comprehensive in their approaches to reform, beyond buying new machines.
Here, we take a crude attempt, measuring reform with indicators of statewide reform. If we want a precise measure of which upgrade paths produced the greatest reductions in the residual vote rate, we need to confine ourselves to the most common paths. There were four upgrade paths that involved more than 50 counties: from punch cards to optical scanners (154 counties), from punch cards to DREs (76), from lever machines to DREs (158), and from optical scanners to DREs (97). All other voting technology changes involved a total of 105 counties. To answer questions like these, we need to simultaneously control for all the factors were previously considered. This is easily done using a simple linear regression model. Each this measure, the county that is the observation is omitted, so that this is a measure of the degree to which voting machines changed in the rest of the state.
Statewide change in residual vote rate is measured by the change in the residual vote rate of a county's state when we exclude the county in question. 5 Therefore, this is the measure of the degree to which the residual vote rate declined in the rest of the state.
Previous residual vote rate is measured by the residual vote rate of the county in 2000. Table 3 reports the regression of change in residual vote on these four independent variables. Column 1 reports the regression results with simply these four control variables. Each performs as expected ---counties from the least electorally competitive states and from state that Table 2 , with the only difference that the coefficients in Table 3 have to be added to the Constant term to produce the percentages in Table 2 .
Like the analysis in Columns 2 and 3, the coefficients from Column 4 are reduced substantially when the controls are added in Column 5. There is one exception, however. The coefficient associated with moving from optical scanning to DREs is only affected slightly when the other controls are added. This finding is intriguing because in previous research (VTP 2001;  Ansolabehere and Stewart 2005), we discovered that optical scanners tended to have the lowest residual vote rates and that DREs tended to have higher residual vote rates. Here we discover that there may be particular gains to be had when a jurisdiction that already uses optical scanners chooses to use the newest generation of DREs. The analysis in this report shows that this effort produced results. One million votes were "recovered" in 2000 because of the dramatic drop in the residual vote rate. Yet this report also suggests a cautionary tale about placing too much faith in buying new machines alone. The greatest residual vote rate gains were not made in the states where voting machines were upgraded in a piecemeal fashion. Rather, voting machine upgrades were the most effective when the entire state was involved. The best example was Georgia, which switched over entirely to one type of voting machine (Diebold Accuvote-TS's) and engaged in an unprecedented voter education effort. It is likely that the combined effects of these two actions, not either one alone, that led to Georgia's stunning improvements over time.
Conclusion

A Political Postscript
There has been much post-election speculation about whether the actions of voting administrators helped or hurt the fortunes of the two major party presidential candidates. In the case of the residual vote rate, the biggest gains occurred in counties that leaned Democratic. We can gain greater precision in this estimate by placing this analysis in a regression framework. Column 1 of Table A1 reports the results of a regression in which the dependent variable is the change in residual vote rate from 2000 to 2004, and the independent variable is the percentage of the two-party vote for Gore in 2000. Column 2 adds the controls that were used in Table 3 , including the dummy variable that indicates that a county had changed voting machines.
Adding the controls cuts the magnitude of the "Gore effect" in half, but it is still statistically and substantially robust. Because we have controlled for mostly non-political factors, it is likely that this reduction in the residual vote rate in counties that were friendly toward Democratic candidates was due to efforts by Kerry campaign workers and supporters to make sure that all their votes were counted. .77
